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Abstract In recent years, several authors have argued
that the desirability of novel technologies should be
assessed early, when they are still emerging. Such an
ethical assessment of emerging technologies is by
definition focused on an elusive object. Usually
promises, expectations, and visions of the technology
are taken as a starting point. As Nordmann and Rip
have pointed out in a recent article, however, ethicists
should not take for granted the plausibility of such
expectations and visions. In this paper, we explore how
the quality of expectations on emerging technologies
might be assessed when engaging in a reflection on the
desirability of emerging technologies. We propose that
an assessment of expectations’ plausibility should focus
on statements on technological feasibility, societal
usability, and desirability of the expected technology.
Whereas the feasibility statement and, to a lesser extent,
the usability statements are frequently quite futuristic,
the claims on desirability, by contrast, often display a
conservative stance towards the future. Assessing the
quality of expectations and visions on behalf of
emerging technologies requires, then, a careful and
well-directed use of both skepticism and imagination.
We conclude with a brief overview of the tools and






During the last decades Western societies have become
aware that it is important to assess the desirability of
new and emerging technologies early in their develop-
ment. The rationale for this is that it is preferable to
anticipate developments when they are still malleable,
even if at this stage the future is still unknown and
uncertain [5]. Especially in the developed West,
governments have therefore started allocating budgets
to study the ethical, legal and social implications of
emerging fields like genomics and nanotechnology.
Several forms of technology assessment (TA) have
been developed as early stage appraisals of emerging
technologies and academic scholars have contributed
with conceptual and methodological studies (see for
example, Constructive TA [24], Real Time TA [12],
Midstream Modulation [8]).
Such forms of ‘upstream’ TA by definition have an




Department of Philosophy, University of Twente,







Enschede, The Netherlandsthus, as yet, exists mainly in the form of visions,
promises and expectations. These may pertain to how
the technology will look like in the laboratory, how it
will perform on the market, how people will use it,
profit from it, and how human life will be improved
as a result. Unfortunately, experience attests that these
expectations
1 at best provide a shaky basis for
deliberation and decision-making. All too often
expectations are colored by the strategic aim to
mobilize support and funding [4, 30], they are
difficult to check by non-experts, and last but not
least: they usually prove to be false or incomplete [7].
As soon as a technology leaves the lab and enters
society, it invariably turns out to do more, or less, than
expected. We have learned to deal with unforeseen
and unintended consequences. Nonetheless, no one
aiming to reflect on the desirability of an emerging
technology can avoid dealing with such visions and
expectations. This raises the question we want to
explore in this article: in the context of an early
ethical reflection on the desirability of new and
emerging technologies, how to assess expectations
and promises on emerging technologies?
To address this question, we take our cue from two
papers by Alfred Nordmann [19] and Nordmann and
Rip [20]. They argue that nanoethics tends to go along
uncritically with technological expectations and
promises, when pointing out the ethical concerns that
these supposed developments raise. On this premise,
they conclude that an ethical reflection on emerging
technologies should start with ‘reality checks’ ([20],
p. 274): ethicists should always start with discussing
‘the quality of promises’ on nanotechnology.
We agree with both authors that the good quality of
technological expectations should not be taken for
granted in the ethics of nanotechnology or, more in
general, new and emerging technologies (NEST).
However, an assessment of the quality of such
expectations requires an ‘epistemological analysis of
uncertain futures’ ([11], p. 99), which is more
complex than their proposal of ‘reality checks’
suggests. In this article, we will elaborate two critical
points. First, since expectations on NESTare strategic,
an appraisal of their quality may benefit from an
analysis of their rhetoric. This redirects the assess-
ment of expectations to the domain of plausible
discourses for a specific audience and highlights
some structural features of expectations statements.
In particular, expectations on NEST do not only
contains statements on technical feasibility, but also
on social usability, and (moral) desirability. The
ethicist should assess these three claims, each of
which requires different strategies.
This exposition leads to our second critical point:
Nordmann and Rip’sp l e af o r‘reality checks’ is
grounded on the premise that many expectations
about emerging technologies are too speculative.
And indeed, this is probably true for the claims about
technical feasibility and—to a lesser extent—for the
claims about social usability. But as far as the claims
about (moral) desirability are concerned, the problem
is not a lack of realism, but a lack of moral
imagination. Expectations on behalf of emerging
technologies rarely take into account that morality,
like technology and society, may change. Therefore,
the task of the ethicist is also to spur the imagination
of potential changes in morality bound to the
expected technology.
Our contribution proposes some tools to improve
the epistemic conditions for a normative reflection on
the desirability of new and emerging technologies. In
doing this, we address, on the one hand, the (often
acknowledged) need ‘for developing criteria and
procedures’ to avoid ‘mere speculations’ (Grunwald
[11] p. 95)
2 and, on the other hand, the (often
neglected) need for encouraging moral imagination
in actors deliberating on emerging technologies.
A ‘Plea for Less Speculation’ in Ethics
Nordmann and Rip warn that in the case of an
emerging technology like nanotechnology ‘ethics
leaps ahead of science’. They refer to the tendency
1 For brevity’s sake, from now on we will use interchangeably
the generic concepts “expectation” or “promise” to refer to all
different forms of ‘presenting future new and emerging
technologies’, like visions, warnings, etc.
2 Armin Grunwald, in a response to Nordmann and Rip’s article
[11], claims that they confuse ‘explorative nanophilosophy’
with ‘applied ethics’. Though he rejects the notion of ‘reality
check’ as misleading in this context, Grunwald acknowledges
‘the need for developing criteria and procedures for better being
able to distinguish between mere speculations and more
plausible futures’(p. 95). Our article can be considered as a
further investigation of how an explorative philosophy of
nanotechnology (or new and emerging technologies, in general)
can critically appraise technology-based visions of the future.
130 Nanoethics (2011) 5:129–141of ethicists to begin their analysis by hypothesizing
futuristic, visionary technologies and then to conclude
by presenting the hugely existential ethical issues
raised by these new technologies. In doing so,
however, the hypothetical stance is usually down-
played and speculative scenarios are presented as
imminent and pressing. This is what Nordmann refers
to as the ‘if and then’ fallacy [19]. As an illustration,
Nordmann discusses ethical debates related to brain–
computer interfaces. These arguments begin with
postulating that such interfaces might become wide-
s p r e a di ns o c i e t y ,o n l yt ot u r ni m m e d i a t e l yt o
discussing ethical concerns regarding the enhance-
ment of human nature. In the process, this type of
ethics fails to address the feasibility of the technology
in question. Furthermore, it discards the hypothetical
status of the premise: “might” becomes “will”. While
feeding unjustified hopes and fears, these discussions
neglect more pressing ethical issues.
Nordmann argues that ethicists too often adopt
technology developers’ expectations without a critical
appraisal of their content. As a result, the quality of
the resulting ethical assessment is questionable and
more pressing ‘here and now’ issues fail to draw the
attention they deserve. By drawing the public gaze
towards unrealistic scenarios, ethicists unwittingly
contribute to turning strategic promises about tech-
nologies (which may be hyped) into generally shared
expectations. In this manner, the ethicist, rather than
acting as a critical force, ends up supporting specific
interest groups. In order to avoid this, ethicists should
be more critical with regard to promises and expect-
ations about emergent technologies and avoid build-
ing their analyses on unwarranted and strategic
claims.
Nordmann and Rip present two strategies to bridge
the gap between futuristic ethical speculation and
actual technology development. First, ethicists should
focus on specific (nano)technologies rather than on
general technological fields: different devices and
technologies raise different ethical challenges. Second,
ethicists should check the information they receive
about the future of nanotechnology. Nordmann and Rip
claim that such ‘reality checks’ should precede any
ethical evaluation of (nano)technology. While we agree
on their first point that ethicists should avoid to reflect
on an abstract “Technology” and prefer instead a
situated analysis of specific technologies, we find the
appeal to “reality checks” more problematic.
According to Nordmann and Rip, the ethicist
delivers “reality checks” by tracing the sources of
expectations and the accountability of people who
make claims on behalf of nanotechnology. In this way,
ethicists assess expectations’ q u a l i t yi no r d e rt o
establish whether they refer to feasible technical
developments worthy of ethical reflection. Therefore,
such a reality check would close the gap between
ethical scenarios and current science. As Nordmann
explains, ‘nanotechnological and other techno-
scientific prospects suffer from the failure to distin-
guish physical possibility (all that does not contradict
outright the laws of nature) and technical possibility
(all that humans can build)’ ([19], p. 4). By assessing
the quality of expectations the ethicist critically
appraises the conditions of technical possibility rather
than taking them for granted.
Although Nordmann and Rip rightly point at
the need for assessing the quality of techno-
scientific expectations, their proposal for “reality
checks” assumes that assessing techno-scientific
expectations is mainly a question of assessing
technical possibility. In the following, we will
argue that the strategic and rhetorical role of
expectations should also be taken into account. In
doing so, dimensions different from technical
possibility come into view.
The Rhetoric Character of Expectations
Techno-scientific expectations are ‘future orientated
abstractions’ [3] that describe an individual or
collective belief in the possibility of a certain state
of affairs to come into being. They are often
expressed in the semantics of intentions, goals,
hopes, or proposals. Expectation statements can be
found at different levels and stages of the techno-
logical innovation process, for example in the
agenda setting of local laboratories, in the resource
allocations of a techno-scientific field, or in spokes-
persons’ press communications [30].
3 The type of
expectations most likely to raise ethical concerns are
those ‘broad and diffuse promises (that) are able to
justify work on the technology “as such”’ (p. 182),
3 [30] points out that these levels are interconnected and that the
related statements, agendas and actions are “nested” (ibi, p 184)
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the scientific community’ ([20], p. 274) with a
strategic role of attracting consensus and resources
[4]. Such expectations outline scenarios of techno-
logical and societal trends and are usually considered
as “taken for granted background” ([30], p. 184)
rather than as issues for discussion. Both their
apparent uncontroversial status and their circulation
in broader, lay and non-specialist contexts, make
these statements a springboard for the ethical
analyses criticized by Nordman and Rip.
T h ei d e ao f“reality check” suggests that ethi-
cists had better go beyond the rhetoric of such
expectations and assess whether they are reliable
given the current state of the art. However, this
focus on ‘reality’ neglects that an analysis of
expectations rhetorical character might provide a
fruitful starting point rather than a limitation for
their assessment. First of all, a perspective focused
on rhetoric fits much better with the prospective
character of expectation statements than a realist
perspective. Secondly, an analysis of the rhetorical
structure of expectation statements can point out
specific features that may serve as a starting point
for assessing such expectations.
To start with the first point: since techno-
scientific expectations are prospective, future ori-
ented statements, whether or not they are ‘true’ can
only be assessed in hindsight—i fe v e r .T h i si sn o t
helpful for the ethicist who wants to reflect on
emerging technologies. This is where the rhetorical
tradition may prove helpful. In this tradition, a
statement is “plausible” or “likely to be true”
4 in a
certain context if a specific audience considers it as
apparently valid and credible. Even without being
able to assess the truth of a claim, people in an
audience will consider a claim plausible if they can
attribute meaning to it and believe that it is
convincing [22]. Assessing the plausibility of
expectations means, then, that one should explore
how expectations are constructed and how and why
different audiences, situated at a particular point in
time and space and within a specific background
knowledge on the topic, perceive them as (im-)
plausible.
The second advantage of a rhetorical approach is
that it can lay bare some of the structural features of
expectation statements. Let’s take two examples of
such broad expectation statements, both in the field of
molecular diagnostics and widely published in the
media:
In critical care settings, such as Emergency
Departments within hospitals, there is a
persistent clinical need for diagnostic solu-
tions that enable fast and accurate patient
triage—for example, diagnosing acute coro-
nary syndromes (e.g. a heart attack) to enable
faster treatment and improve patient out-
comes. The fully automated handheld testing
devices that will be developed jointly by
Philips and bioMérieux will be immunoassay-
based and employ Philips’ new Magnotech
biosensor platform. They are intended to assist
clinicians in time-critical decision-making by
reducing delays involved in laboratory-based
testing.
5
Every year more than 10,000 couples in the
Netherlands apply for help because of invol-
untary childlessness. A sperm analysis is
typically the first step of fertility research.
Testing sperm quality requires stringent pre-
test preparations and a specialized laboratory.
Tests often have to be repeated two to five
times for sufficient reliability. If men can
carry out the tests in the privacy of their
own home this makes the procedure much
less awkward for them. Moreover, the proba-
bility of a reliable diagnosis is increased as
well. Finally, the researchers think that the
costs for health insurers can be decreased too
[…] On the new chip, the spermatozoa flow
through a fluid channel, above which electro-
des are fitted. When a cell flows under this
‘bridge’, its electrical resistance changes mo-
mentarily, and this event is counted. […]The
user will only be able to see that the test has
4 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the primary
meaning of ‘plausible’ is ‘acceptable, agreeable, pleasing,
gratifying; winning public approval, popular’ or ‘of an
argument, an idea, a statement, etc.…: seeming reasonable,
probable or truthful; convincing, believable’.
5 “Philips and bioMérieux announce partnership to develop and
market next-generation handheld diagnostic solutions for point-
of-care.” (n.d.). Retrieved January 18, 2011, from http://www.
business-sites.philips.com/sites/philipsbs/magnotech/press/
20100107-partnership.page.
132 Nanoethics (2011) 5:129–141been completed successfully; the gynecologist
will inform him of the actual results personally.
6
When we look at the structure of these expect-
ations, there are some similarities. In both cases the
expectation statements rest on three interrelated types
of claims:
a) claims about the characteristics and functioning
of the technology;
b) claims about how the technology will be adopted
by the intended users and how it will be
integrated in current (medical) practice;
c) claims about how the technology will address a
social problem or need. (In both quoted frag-
ments, this claim is situated at the very beginning
as a preliminary justification of the desirability of
the technology).
Although the precise rhetorical structure of
expectations in specific cases can vary and the
identification of the different claims is not always
clear-cut, this distinction serves the analytical
function of singling out different, but often
entangled messages implied in techno-scientific expect-
ations. In particular, it shows that such expectations
claim much more than justtechnical possibility. Ifthisis
the case ‘responsible discourse on societal and ethical
aspects’[19] should not only assess claims on technical
feasibility. The claims on usability and desirability of
the expected technology should be assessed as well. In
the next section, we will see what this means in
practice.
Unraveling Expectations
We have pointed out three different claims that can be
distinguished in broad expectation statements to a
lay audience. This means that, in the illustrative
case of the expectation on the “fertility chip” (the
second quotation above), ethicists should assess not
only the conditions for the technical possibility of
the chip, but also the conditions for its usability and
desirability. For each of these aspects, we cannot assess
their objective reality or truth, however we can
analyze to what extent and at which conditions a
specific audience, holding a more or less specific
knowledge on the topic, considers these expect-
ations plausible.
A: Technological Feasibility: Eliminating Strategic
Distortions
The first question when assessing the technical
feasibility of emerging technologies is: shouldn’t the
ethicist trust the scientific experts? Why not simply
believe researchers working on the fertility chip when
they expect that their chip will eventually assess
semen concentration and motility more reliably than
the current microscope-based technique?
There are two reasons for distrust. First, the
history of technology development illustrates that
many such claims by scientists never materialize.
Moreover, the sociology of expectations [4]p o i n t s
out that such claims are often motivated by the
strategic aim to attract support and funding. Ethicists
facing public expectations on emerging technologies
have to keep in mind that: a) when speaking in
public scientists have to adapt to the audience’s
background knowledge, and b) in a specific context
scientists might have strategic reasons to make their
work acceptable and important for society, framing
what they do within a storyline that is meaningful for
the audience. Thus, the aims of the actor who states
expectations and the audience that she has to reach
are two important factors to take into account when
analyzing expectations’ plausibility. Whether expect-
ations appear in newspapers or TV shows, funding
proposals, scientific journals or informal research
meetings, they are constructed to be convincing for a
specific audience and goal.
Thus, ethicists should address questions like:
What is the background of the person uttering an
expectation? What is the audience s/he is address-
ing? What could be the strategic role of the
expectation under examination? This contextualiza-
tion allows the ethicist to point out some discursive
strategies used by scientists to persuade the audi-
ence of the feasibility of the technology: for
example, the emphasis on some particular charac-
teristics of the chip—like its reliability and porta-
bility, or the joint presentation of some challenges
for the chip development and the planned strategies
6 University of Twente (2010, February 17). “Reliable home
male fertility test? Accurate sperm counts now possible”.
ScienceDaily. Retrieved January 18, 2011, from http://www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/02/100216221151.htm#
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7 or the stress on the reasons for
trusting the success of the technology.
8
In particular, scientists might justify their expect-
ations on some future technology on the basis of the
state of the art (like their previous success with the
lab-on-a-chip platform), scientific evidence (the
experimentally proven ability of the chip to distin-
guish between different particles) and the scientific
paradigm (concentration, motility and shape of sper-
matozoa as indicators of sperm fertility). At the level
of public communication these justifications for
trusting expectations might not be discussed
because there is an “epistemic asymmetry” [25]
between the speaker and the audience. However, it is
possible for the ethicist interested in emerging
technologies to investigate expectations at the loca-
tions where scientific development takes place, like
scientific journals and laboratories. In those settings
researchers relate to their peers and try to gain their
acceptance [9].
As laboratory studies have shown, the laboratory is
the place where controversies and compromises take
place before scientific facts are created and commu-
nicated to the outside world [14]. In this “protected”
space, the discursive strategies, used by researchers to
build their arguments and convince their “internal”
audience, are different from the ones that are
employed to reach an “external” audience. Thus,
while scientific articles describe the outcomes of
scientific research as “facts” abstracted from modality
and history, the laboratory offers an interesting access
to expectations, where the materiality of the technology
is still visible, together with the uncertainties, chal-
lenges, controversies and doubts. In such a context, an
ethicist comes across controversies and uncertainties
that are covered-up in more public arenas, and may
analyze the conceptual and material building blocks of
expectations.
Let’s take again the example of the fertility chip. The
fertility chip is expected to measure the change in
resistance when a particle, say a spermatozoon, passes
through two electrodes. Such a disturbance on the field
line results in a peak in the signal. By counting the
peaks, it is possible to determine the concentration of
spermatozoa in the samples, which is their number per
milliliter. Between this physical principle based on
Ohm’s law and the final performance of the chip, there
are many other considerations, physical principles,
technical and biological constraints and scientific
uncertainties that play an important role in the develop-
ment process. For example, how are researchers’
expectations on the measurement of an electrical field’s
disturbance affected by the necessity to operate with
nano-quantities of fluid? What are the challenges they
encounter when they want to include the sensor in a
“user-friendly” device? And how do scientific contro-
versies on the best classifications and reference values
for assessing semen quality affect their decisions?
On the laboratory floor, the ethicist can explore
techno-scientists’ expectations in a context that is less
tainted by strategic considerations. This helps in
pointing out uncertainties, scientific controversies
and additional challenges that might constrain or
redirect the development of the technology. Such an
awareness of the state of the art should reduce wild
speculations on the technology’s potential. Further-
more, by understanding and analyzing researchers’
expectations on how the technology will work, the
ethicist can identify details that are relevant for
prospective thinking on the device’s performance
outside the lab. For example, the expected fertility
chip, despite its accuracy in comparison to other “pre-
scanning” devices for male fertility, is presented by
researchers as not accurate enough to replace more
decisive laboratory tests or to provide attainable
results with only one measurement. What does that
mean for its usability?
B: Societal Usability: Incorporating User Perspectives
to Assess Implicit Scripts
Exploring the performance of an emerging technology
in the context of the lab is only one step to assess
7 “Concentration is not the only indicator of sperm quality.
Spontaneous activity—also known as motility—and the shape
of the spermatozoa are also important factors. Further research
will need to establish whether these two quality characteristics
can be measured in a similar manner, so that a compact device
can be developed in which a chip can be inserted for single
use.” University of Twente (2010, February 17). “Reliable
home male fertility test? Accurate sperm counts now possible”.
ScienceDaily. Retrieved January 18, 2011, from http://www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/02/100216221151.htm#
8 “It is important that the count distinguishes between sperma-
tozoa and other particles or cells in the fluid: if other particles
are included the count will be unreliable. Segerink added
minuscule balls to the fluid to test its selectivity. The method
proved to be selective enough to distinguish between the balls
and the spermatozoa.” (Ibidem)
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space of “facts” production, but rather a material
environment of controversies and social practices, the
expectations on the performance of a device are
somewhat reduced to technical conditions. However,
technologically possible expectations might imply
impossible social conditions. The next step, then, is
to analyze the expected use of the technology and its
performance in societal practices. In the case of the
fertility chip, for example, it is expected that ‘men can
carry out the tests in the privacy of their own home
[…] The user will only be able to see that the test has
been completed successfully; the gynecologist will
inform him of the actual results personally’.
9 This
vision of future medical practice is built on some
presuppositions about the way society works and
about the practices in which the technology is
supposed to be embedded. Along the lines of “script
theory” [1], we can reconstruct the network of
relations designed around a technology and the
assumptions about the environment in which the
artifact will be performing. These assumptions and
the network of relations envisioned in expectations of
future technologies have been referred to as a “fictive
script” [6].
Uncovering the fictive script of an emerging
technology means to inquire into how researchers’
envision the context of application of the technol-
ogy and how it will be handled by doctors,
insurance companies, etc., and finally the patient.
For example, the intended users of the fertility chip
are both men, who want to test themselves for
infertility, and gynecologists, who will inform them
of the result. How will men get the chip? What
social structure should be in place for this purpose?
What will the chip look like when handed over to
the patient? What is the sequence of actions the
patient should perform at home? How many times
should sample testing be repeated? What should the
gynecologist do when the patient brings in the
semen analyzer? In which cases is the result
considered reliable? Addressing these questions
means to produce detailed descriptions of the
envisioned use of the device beyond the lab walls.
Such “thick descriptions”
10 are a tool to imagine the
device in the social context and to point out the
social conditions that are implicit in the expectations
on an emerging technology.
By adding details on the expected context of use
and on the users imagined by researchers, a more
concrete scenario is outlined. The next step is to
investigate to what extent these scenarios are plausi-
ble for an audience of gynecologists, nurses, GPs,
clinical chemists, patients and other actors who are
engaged in relevant existing practices, and have some
expertise on how they work. Their knowledge and
expertise can be collected with methods developed in
“Constructive Technology Assessment” practices,
including interviews or workshops with various
experts that are or will be related to the technology
at stake and (potential) users groups [23]. This input
may then help to assess the social conditions implicit in
the visions and designs of the technology developers. It
could serve to rule out particular presuppositions or
visions because implausible for some stakeholders who
have a better expertise in a certain social practice than
technology developers, or it could help to point out
where changes in current practice would be necessary.
Interactive workshops with a broad set of stakeholders
may help to explore how, for the envisioned technology
to function in the expected social setting, institutional
changes might be needed or, on the contrary, how
current institutional dynamics and configurations might
dictate some technical requirement. For example,
when we reconstruct how the semen analyzer is
supposed to be used in the practice of testing male
fertility, we can point out the different steps that
users have to go through. Then, based on stake-
holders’ expectations, one can hypothesize how the
current logistical system for testing of male fertility
should change to adapt to this new device; or how
some institutional/economical/legal resistance can
be expected to prevent the expected use of the
device in the medical practice, or even to encourage
its use in another practice, for example to assess
bulls’ fertility in the deeds of sale in the animal
industry.
Analyzing the expected use of the emerging
technology by investigating what is considered as
9 University of Twente (2010, February 17). “Reliable home
male fertility test? Accurate sperm counts now possible”.
ScienceDaily. Retrieved January 18, 2011, from http://www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/02/100216221151.htm#
10 We borrow the term “thick description” from the field of
anthropology; in future oriented studies they can also be called
“scenarios”.
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involved in the development of the technology, is both
a critical and a constructive activity. By discussing the
envisioned technology with intended users and other
stakeholders, it is possible to point out where
developers’ visions collide with other actors’ views
and beliefs. But it also adds new perspectives and
enriches the initial visions by imagining how current
practices might change, spurred by social dynamics
and users’ creativity.
C: Desirability: Exploring the Assumed Morality
The third and last dimension of technological expect-
ations is the appeal to desirability: the new technology
is claimed to satisfy individual and/or societal needs
or to solve a problem (of an individual, of society,
humankind or even the world at large). Assessing
these claims builds on the previous two analyses, but
now the focus is on how the impact of a technology
will be normatively evaluated. What is scrutinized
here is how the morality implied in an expectation is
accepted as plausible according to the morality of
different audiences of such expectation.
In techno-scientific promises, the “benefits” of the
technology are unquestionably presented. Their desir-
ability is often asserted as patent. All these claims on
a technology’s “benefit” carry along certain systems
of values and morality. For instance, the expectations
about the fertility analyzer hint at very general values
that may seem hardly contestable, like privacy,
autonomy and cost-efficiency. Which man would not
appreciate his privacy to be respected, his intimacy to
be increased, and his comfort to be improved when
testing his own fertility? Which society doesn’t want
expenses to be reduced and quality of health care
increased? And which gynecologist wouldn’t wel-
come her work to be easier and her patient happier?
However, as [18] shows for the case of nanomedicine,
on further inspection such general claims often prove
quite vague and ambiguous, or even inconsistent,
because they are entangled in multiple views of what
is ‘good’. A philosophical analysis, aimed at “disen-
tangling” the concepts and values lurking behind the
eye-catching slogans, is needed in order to enable a
fruitful debate on the desirability of the new technology.
Such analysis, for instance, would unravel the promises
that the fertility chip will improve the current medical
practice or will protect the privacy of the patient,
analyzing the assumed concepts of “private” or “good
care” and assessing the internal consistency of these
promises.
Beside the inherent strategic ambiguity in the
normative stance of many promises on NEST, an
analysis of desirability claims should also take into
account how these claims are appraised among
audiences with diverse normative stances. This point
is highlighted by the type of Technology Assessment
known as “Vision Assessment” [10]. According to
this approach, there are some values, norms and views
of a good life that are implied by expectations and
visions on NEST. To improve political deliberation on
NEST, these normative worldviews should be expli-
cated and analyzed by inquiring the normative
perspective of different stakeholders and pointing
out eventual controversies. Normative controversies
on the benefits of an emerging technology show that
not every potential user or stakeholder deems plausi-
ble techno-scientists’ universal claims on desirability.
The allegedly universal benefits that a technology is
supposed to bring about are, de facto, not unani-
mously shared or understood. Drawing again on the
case of the fertility analyzer, we could explore the
values implicit in different stakeholders’ expect-
ations. For example, the reasons why engineers
consider the technology “good” might not match
with doctors’ and patients’ considerations: whereas
engineers might be concerned about the accuracy of
the test, doctors might be more focused on their
possibilities to control the result of the test, while
patients might emphasize the portability of the
device. This diversity in what is considered ‘good’
about the chip may hide potential controversy about
what would be the best use of the chip. Some
patients could claim, for example, their freedom not
to go to the gynecologist’s for additional testing,
whereas the doctors may claim responsibility to
assess the quality of the test.
Potential future controversies around the desirability
of the technology can also be imagined actively and
systematically by using patterns of moral argumentation
known from earlier debates on emerging technologies.
As Swierstra and Rip [26] have shown, such debates
often have a ‘grammar’ that can be used to speculate in
a controlled way about the way future debates on
newly emerging technologies might evolve. For the
case of the fertility analyzer the patterns highlighted by
Swierstra and Rip suggest that future controversies
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opportunities for men and women, the medicalization
of everyday life, or the reduced quality of healthcare
practice. By exploring the implicit conflicts of values
between developers and users or among users, and by
systematically imagining future ethical controversies, it
is possible to assess how robust the initial, apparently
uncontroversial expectations really are.
This analysis of normative controversies—inherent
in the promises of the desirability of emerging
technologies, or implicit in stakeholder’s expect-
ations, or likely to emerge in future ethical debate—
shows that the allegedly universal worldviews offered
in promises can be scrutinized according to the
normative stance of situated audiences. Moreover,
these desirability-claims should also be assessed with
respect to their vague assertions that the technology in
question will have some intended (desirable) impacts
on society and individuals. The exercise of develop-
ing “thick descriptions” of the future practice,
discussed in the previous section, comes to hand
here. Such descriptions offer a situated context in
which we can develop ‘an open eye or a keen
sensitivity’ [16] for how the expected technology
may have an impact on people’s daily life, practical
routines, experience of their bodies, power relations,
allocations of roles and responsibilities—the so-called
‘soft impacts’ of the technology [27]. For example, if
the user of the fertility analyzer has to test himself
constantly for one month and wait for the gynecolo-
gist’s verdict, can we still deem this device user-
friendly? And if the user has to handle the analyzer in
the private of her house, which new obligations raise
from this gained autonomy? Recent research in
empirical philosophy of technology provides ample
examples of how to bring into view the often very
mundane, but nonetheless very real impacts of novel
technologies [2, 17, 31].
These philosophically-oriented studies, together
with a more sociologically-oriented research on
technology’s “users” [15, 21], show that practices
may change in unexpected ways because of the
introduction of a new technology. These phenomena
have to be taken into account when appraising the
expected desirable impact of the technology on
human practices. The fertility analyzer, for instance,
while changing the practice of testing for male
fertility might also affect the feelings and the behavior
of the users’ partners and this could, in turn, have
unintended consequences on the way the device is
used. Exploring such unexpected turns of events
broadens developers’ and stakeholders’ visions of
future techno-social practices with phenomena that
are plausible in the context of history of technology:
as history shows, it is an exception rather than a rule
that users employ artifacts solely in the ways intended
by the designers.
These unexpected events, however, become less
surprising if we frame them in the context of the
phenomenon of techno-moral change [27]. If it is true
that technology, society and morality are bound up
together, then changes in one are likely to invite
changes in the others [13]. Established norms and
values inform technology development, but new
technologies also create new problems, opportunities
and constraints the existing moral resources cannot
cope with. We have to seriously consider the
possibility that envisioned technological develop-
ments affect (and interact with) moral developments.
History is full of examples of techno-moral change.
The telescopes enabled Galileo’s discovery that the
Earth revolved around the sun—a discovery with
profound religious and anthropological repercussions.
The automobile enabled people to escape the tradi-
tional moralities of their villages. The contraceptive
pill not only substantially contributed to women’s
emancipation, but also to that of homosexuals, as this
technology severed the ‘sacred’ link between sex and
procreation that was one of the main grounds for
moral condemnation of homosexuals. The cell phone
has revolutionized notions of privacy and availability;
and so forth. Techno-moral change is not an excep-
tional event; it is to be expected. Assessing the
desirability of visions of the future on the basis of
the morality of today would therefore be unduly
conservative.
It is striking, however, that the morality underlying
technological expectations and visions is often all too
familiar. As shown above in the case of the fertility
analyzer, visions of emerging technologies center on
values like health/wellbeing, safety and the environ-
ment—the usual suspects, so to speak. These visions
do not take into account that the meaning of these
values or their relevance may be liable to change [28].
Thus, whereas feasibility and, to a lesser extent,
usability claims need to be assessed because of
uncritical hyping and futurism, claims on (moral)
desirability more likely need to be assessed because
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ations and visions demands serious reflection on
potential techno-moral change, rather than an uncritical
acceptance of an allegedly shared current morality.
The ethicist should aim to make stakeholders
more sensitive to the novelty-creating role of
technology, by exploring the unexpected moral
changes that the new technology might bring about.
This can be done in a grounded way by building on
instances of techno-moral change that have oc-
curred in the past. We are not suggesting, of course,
that history repeats itself and that the imagined
future simply is an updated version of past events.
However, history does provide examples from
which we can draw patterns of the mutual shaping
of technology and morality that are an important
ingredient for fictive, and yet grounded, reflections
on future techno-moral change.
Ethics of NESTas Broadening: Between Plausibility
and Moral Imagination
So far, we have elaborated on Nordmann’s and Rip’s
plea for a critical assessment of expectations with
regard to emerging technologies. We agree with them
that ethical reflection on emerging technologies
should be based on plausible expectations with regard
to what these technologies might do in society. We
argued that an assessment of techno-scientific expect-
ations on emerging technologies should concern not
only their technical possibility, but also the expected
social usability of the technology and the expected
(moral) desirability. In pointing out possible strategies
and conceptual tools for such an assessment, we
observed that assessing claims on these three dimen-
sions often leads to divergent conclusions. Whereas
claims of technological feasibility and societal accep-
tance may often be too speculative (as [20] already
pointed out), we argued that by contrast claims of
moral desirability as a rule are insufficiently specula-
tive. Therefore, an ethicist who wants not just to
a s s e s sb u ta l s ot oh e l pi m p r o v et h eq u a l i t yo f
expectations will have to play very different roles.
We will elaborate this in the next section. Here, we
want to reflect on the basis for these diagnoses. How
exactly can ethicists observe a lack or an overflow of
plausibility? Which perspective is implied in such
assessments?
The concept of “plausibility” is inherently intersub-
jective:a statement isplausible whenitmakes sense toa
specific audience. Critics may wonder, then, whether it
is useful or even possible to check or contest the
plausibility of claims from a standpoint that is external
to this intended audience. If the audience is decisive,
doesn’t this imply that the validity of judgments on
plausibility is context dependent? A lay audience may
judge claims as plausible that seem utterly implausible
to a group of scientific experts, and even different
groupsofexpertsmayhaveverydifferentviewsonwhat
isplausible.Sohowcanwe(andotherethicists)criticize
technological expectations for being too futuristic and
moral expectations for being too conservative? To
clarify our position it is useful to refer once more to
the tradition of rhetoric.
The definition of “plausible” referred to in “The
Rhetoric Character of Expectations” (in this article)
includes two aspects: approbation and appearance. An
audience’s approbation of a claim will usually depend
on an audience’s perception that the claim appears to
be right. Well-known and familiar statements will
receive approbation more easily than new and
unexpected ones. Statements clearly linked to an
audience’s sphere of understanding are more likely
to trigger suspension of disbelief. This seems true
both for lay audiences and for scientific and techno-
logical experts. Then it is safe to claim that statements
on what emerging technologies will bring about will
usually be judged against a background of existing
views on technology, society and morality.
This situatedness of judgments on the plausibility of
expectations, however, does not mean that we have to
accept all judgments at face value. On the contrary, by
becoming aware of the contextual aspects and by
comparing divergent views, we can also point out
(some of) the assumptions that characterize an audien-
ce’s epistemic and moral background and analyze them
critically. In this way, we can become more aware of the
limitations of some visions. A lay audience may not be
in a good position to judge claims of technological
feasibility. An engineer, on the other hand, may hardly
have the background knowledge to judge claims on
behalf of societal plausibility. And both may lack the
knowledge to assess claims on behalf of the potential
interaction between technology and morality. However,
all these perspectives are needed to improve the
epistemological conditions for a normative reflection
on the desirability of on emerging technologies.
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normative debate on emerging technologies, the
context in which expectations are assessed should be
broadened in two respects. The first is what we might
call a horizontal broadening: by including different
sources of information as well as different stake-
holders, both the number of people and the back-
groundknowledgeagainstwhichtojudgecertainclaims
may be extended. This type of broadening is also aimed
for in “participatory” or “constructive” technology
assessment and ethicists can learn a lot from these
endeavors [23]. The second could be called a vertical
broadening: by feeding the discussions and assess-
ments with historical knowledge, the plausibility of
claims on behalf of emerging technologies can be
grounded in experience, at least to some extent. This
historical knowledge may relate to past cases of
emerging technologies, evolutions of social practices,
cases of users’“ unexpected” behaviors, patterns of
ethical controversies and techno-moral change.
This historical perspective undergirds our conclu-
sions with regard to technological and social versus
moral plausibility. Claims on behalf of technological
feasibility seem to neglect that the path of history is
strewn with expectations that failed to come true.
Likewise, claims on behalf of societal plausibility
seem to ignore the many ways in which things ‘bit
back’ in the past [29]: technologies developed in the
lab for a particular kind of aim and a particular type of
setting may serve very different aims and functions in
completely different settings when used in the ‘real
world’. Claims on behalf of moral plausibility, on the
other hand, tend to neglect the many examples of
moral change resulting from technological develop-
ment. Again, such historical insights cannot be used
as unambiguous evidence to ‘prove’ the (im)plausi-
bility of a specific claim with regard to the future.
They may help, nonetheless, to correct one-sided
views of the future and they can suggest which factors
prevented or accelerated change in the past.
This is exactly where the ethicist may play a
mediating and facilitating role between science and
society in processes of deliberation on emerging
technologies. By exploring expectations of an emerging
technology in different contexts, ethicists can temporar-
ily step out of the situated judgments of plausibility,
analyze controversies, and scrutinize epistemic and
normative assumptions. By doing this, additional
information—about technical challenges, socialdynam-
ics, users’ creativity, value frameworks and techno-
moral changes—might be brought into the debate and
broadening the background knowledge of the lay
audience. In this respect, the role of the ethicist is to
stretch the lay audience’s imagination, showing that
what seemed plausible at first glance may be less so
when we look at it more closely, and conversely that
what seemed implausible at first glance might appear
more likely when we take into account other perspec-
tives and knowledge. The initial imaginative boundaries
are, therefore, redrawn by altering the assumed shared
knowledge and information. This provides all stake-
holders with a better position to democratically deliber-
a t eo ne m e r g i n gt e c h n o l o g i e s .
Some Tools for Ethics of Emerging Technologies
We started with the observation that debates on the
desirability of emerging technologies by definition
deal with an elusive object. Because emerging
technologies to a large extent consist of expectations,
visions, and promises, ethicists who want to facilitate
debate on the desirability of such emerging technol-
ogies should first assess the quality of the claims that
compose an expectation and explore their content.
Since these claims are multifaceted, this assessment
requires a broad set of different activities. It is not our
aim here to present a full-fledged methodology.
However, the preceding analysis suggests at least
some tools that could be used to assess expectations
and thus to avoid the twin dangers of purely
speculative AND unimaginative ethical reflection.
Asfaras“technicalfeasibility”isconcerned,ethicists
will have to critically assess the context in which
specific claims on behalf of emerging technologies are
made and reinterpret them in view of this context. They
also should make sure that a number of experts are
consulted and confronted with each other. And finally,
they can actively search for situations in which expect-
ations on the technologycan be analyzed more indepth,
for example by going tothe lab orthe R&D department.
Here, ethicists could investigate the history of a
particular technology as well as the uncertainties and
challenges at stake in current developments. All this is
necessary to imagine more in detail whether and how
the final technological product is expected to work and
to rule out at least some expectations on potential uses
and applications as too futuristic.
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decisions partiallydependontheir ideas about the social
useofthefinalproduct,thisfirststepshouldbefollowed
by an assessment of the “social usability” of their
expectations. Here, the ethicist should aim for ‘thick
descriptions’ of the practice in which the technology is
supposed to be embedded. She should ensure that
visions of a device are translated into visions of
technological practices, for example by analyzing the
‘fictive scripts’ implicit in the design. Subsequently, this
envisioned practice should be discussed with potential
users and other stakeholders. CTA interactions and
workshops are good tools to explore future develop-
ments of technology in society, grounding such visions
on stakeholders’ situated expertise and learning of
techno-social dynamics. Here, again, historical knowl-
edge of how the current practice evolved and which
factorswerecrucialinthatevolutionmighthelptojudge
the likelihood of specific changes.
Finally, the ethicist should critically appraise the
claims on the desirability of the technology. Rather than
using those claims on benefit as a starting point for
passing ethical judgment, the ethicist should assess the
assumptions on which they seem plausible. Such claims
presuppose an allegedly shared morality; the ethicist’s
task now is to look for potential controversies on the
desirability of the technology at hand. By making
explicit which values and moral justifications are
embedded in expectations and analyzing which values
are implied by the current practices and ideals of
different stakeholders, the ethicist can discover some
not-yet-expressed ethical controversies. By using the
historically informed NEST -ethics approach [26], it is
also possible to systematically imagine which possible
future controversies might emerge. In order to imagine
how technology-society and morality can interact in
unexpected ways, we propose to consider the above-
mentioned ‘thick descriptions’ in the perspective of the
lessons about how users’ creativity often surprises
designers’ visions and makes unexpected (and seem-
ingly implausible) scenarios become real. Finally,
ethicist might draw from the history of techno-moral
change. Patterns observed in the mutual shaping of
technology and morality in the past may be used to
construct scenarios of future changes.
This set of tools should prepare the ethicist of
emerging technologies to deal with this elusive object
without yielding to futuristic or conservative claims.
These tools should create the conditions for a debate
on emerging technologies in which all relevant stake-
holders can participate and discuss grounded, and yet
unexpected futures.
Conclusion
Nordmann and Rip correctly observed that ethics goes
along with the hypes and hopes of emerging technologies
far too easily. Skeptics might conclude from this
observation that it does not make sense to assess the
potential ethical implications of emerging technologies,
because it is just too early to tell what their impact will be.
In this paper, we have argued that it is possible to perform
an early “ethical” assessment of emerging technologies
that is both grounded and imaginative. We have articulat-
ed an approach in which the quality of techno-scientific
promises can be assessed in a comprehensive way in
which not only the claims on technical feasibility, but also
the claims on usability and desirability are analyzed,
questioned and broadened. The role of the ethicist is to
analyze the judgments of plausibility of techno-scientific
promises, and to point out internal controversies that can
ground the discourse on emerging technologies on
concrete technological and social practices. The ethicist
contributes to the quality of expectations by exploring the
social and human context in which the technology is
expected to operate, and by integrating lessons on moral-
change that may be learnt from philosophy and history of
technology. Such interventions can broaden both the
setting and the content of ethical deliberations on
emerging technologies. From this broadened epistemic
background, society can re-frame plausibility judgments
on emerging technologies and ground the debate on their
desirability on a constructive moral imagination.
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